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NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SYSTEM
Comments
AMBASSADOR IRA SHAPIRO*, S. BRUCE WILSON**, D.G. WADDELL***,
AND BERND LANGEHEINE****
AMBASSADOR IRA SHAPIRO: Ambassador Shapiro stated that from the perspective
of the United States, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been largely suc-
cessful. He recalled that in 1994, at the time of consideration of the WTO
Agreements by Congress, there had been serious concerns about loss of sover-
eignty, which led to the "Dole proposal." But, in the end, Congress supported the
WTO, including the dispute settlement system. Three years later, we learn that we
were correct in determining that the system would be beneficial to us. Under GATT,
the ability of the losing party to block decisions had been very frustrating to the
United States. The value of binding dispute settlement has been borne out.
The United States has been the most active user of the dispute settlement
system, bringing over thirty-five cases. On balance, the United States has had
more victories than losses. Some of the victories have been against major trading
partners, as in EU-Beef Hormones, EU-Bananas, Canada-Split Run Maga-
zines, and Japan-Alcoholic Beverages. This is important, because inability to
get concessions from major trading partners was precisely what prompted the
United States to opt for binding dispute resolution. U.S. losses have been relatively
modest. In cases brought by the United States, the U.S. record is something like
seventeen and one. In some cases, such as Japan-Sound Recordings, merely
*Ambassador Ira Shapiro is Minister (Economic) and Deputy Head of Mission for the Embassy
of Canada.
**S. Bruce Wilson is a partner with Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C.
***Since January 1996, Douglas G. Waddell has been Minister (Economic) and Deputy Head of
Mission at the Embassy of Canada, in Washington, D.C. Previously he was Director General, Trade
Policy Bureau and Economic Policy Bureau, from 1987 to 1991. Prior to that Mr. Waddell had
various trade policy assignments relating to Canada-U.S. trade relations.
****Bernd Langeheine is Trade Counselor at the Delegation of the European Commission. He
has been with the Commission since 1983, starting out in the Directorate-General for External
Relations where he worked in the trade policy instruments division. His work included general policy
and multilateral issues (GATT) as well as managing anti-dumping and safeguard cases.
812 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
bringing the case to the WTO prompted settlement. Shapiro noted that the United
States has not pursued the Dole proposal for domestic review of WTO dispute
settlement decisions, and that is probably for the best.
However, Shapiro stated that there have been some unfortunate decisions. One
of these was the Japan-Film case. That case illustrated the point that hard cases
make bad law. The panel in that case focused excessively on individual measures
and not enough on the overall picture. As Ambassador Barshefsky observed in the
wake of the panel report in Japan-Film, the panel "showed an instinct for the
capillary." Japan-Film may show the limits of WTO panels' ability to deal with
subtle forms of trade discrimination. The WTO should have lent its weight to the
position that the Japanese film distribution system is not open. Nevertheless, some
progress was made. Despite the formal outcome of the panel proceeding, Japan
did feel, owing to the pendency of the case and the spotlight it shone on Japanese
government and private sector practices, the need to reform its distribution system.
For instance, Japan made changes to its Large-Scale Retail Stores law and took
film out of the 1995 Business Reform Law. In the United States, Congress and the
public should look at the Japan-Film case in context, and they probably will.
Next, Shapiro emphasized that under the WTO dispute settlement system,
litigation does not replace negotiation. There is still a role for negotiation. He cited
Japan-Sound Recordings and Brazil-Automobiles as cases in which negotiation
played a significant role following the threat of litigation. Even if a party succeeds
in litigation, it still must negotiate with its adversary to devise an appropriate
remedy. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages is an example of substantial negotiation
over a remedy following affirmative decisions by the panel and Appellate Body.
Referring to Ambassador Yerxa's paper, Shapiro highlighted several problems
for the dispute settlement system that are on the horizon. One problem is the
general hostility to the U.S. antidumping law. The U.S. antidumping law will
be challenged in the future, and we can't be certain of its ultimate fate. A second
problem will be the use of trade sanctions to pursue foreign policy goals, as in
the case of the Helms-Burton Act and sanctions imposed by Massachusetts on
companies that invest in Burma. Shapiro expressed his hope that such matters
will remain in the realm of diplomacy, rather than entering the realm of trade
dispute settlement. These are essentially foreign policy matters, not trade protec-
tion matters. Further, the United States has undertaken an evaluation of these
policies in light of opposition from allies, and over time, these issues will sort
themselves out. A third problem on the horizon is the linkages between trade
and the environment, which will test the limits of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
Shapiro encouraged negotiation over such issues, as was done in the United
States-Tuna-Dolphin case and the EU-Leghold Traps case.
Finally, Shapiro observed once again that the United States has benefited a
great deal from the WTO's dispute settlement system. The United States has
managed to use the dispute settlement tools created by the WTO very effectively.
The questions were posed as to how one can distinguish legitimate motives from
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illegitimate motives in cases such as the Helms-Burton Act and the Massachusetts
legislation concerning investment in Burma, and why a policy should be treated
differently in dispute settlement simply because it was prompted by a foreign
policy motive.
Shapiro responded that in the Helms-Burton and Massachusetts/Burma cases,
the motivations of the legislators influenced his judgment that these were foreign
policy matters and not trade matters. Also, the volume of trade affected and
the legislative history influenced his judgment. He noted that there have been
diplomatic consequences for the United States in these two cases, and they weigh
in the balance in evaluating those policies.
S. BRUCE WILSON: Wilson commented that the dispute settlement system is
a work in progress. So far, the record of its performance has been very positive,
but Congress is watching closely. However, the key year, from the perspective
of the U.S. Congress, is not 1998 but 2000. Under section 125 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act-the so-called Gingrich "sovereignty provision" -every
five years Congress may consider, pursuant to a privileged resolution introduced
by any Member of Congress, whether or not the United States should remain
in the WTO. So, 2000 is when the political debate in Congress on the performance
of the WTO could lead to some legislative response.
Several controversial, as-yet-unresolved cases could trigger the political de-
bate. These include cases which the United States is the plaintiff- U. S.-Helms-
Burton, U.S. -Massachusetts-Burma Investments, and EU-Shrimp-Turtle-as
well as cases in which the United States was the complaining party, such as
EU-Bananas, EU-Beef Hormones, and Japan-Film. The key in EU-Beef
Hormones and EU-Bananas will be whether there has been effective implementa-
tion by the EU. The jury is still out on how the European Union will implement
the decisions in those cases. In the Japan-Film case, we still must wait to see
what the practical outcome will be under the Administration's new monitoring
initiative, in terms of impact on opening of the Japanese market. Satisfactory
implementation still must be devised in many cases in which the United States
has prevailed on the complaining party, and politicians will be watching closely.
Wilson also commented that U.S. antidumping legislation will be another topic
in the political debate about continued U.S. participation in the WTO dispute
settlement system. A concerted effort was made to draft amendments to the
U.S. antidumping law to ensure compliance with WTO obligations. The U.S.
antidumping law probably will be challenged. However, other countries are more
vulnerable than the United States in this area. There may be a proliferation of
challenges to antidumping laws in the WTO, but they may not necessarily be
against the United States. One key in how the WTO antidumping agreement will
be evaluated, both domestically and internationally, is the outcome of sunset
reviews under U.S. law.
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In conclusion, Wilson commented that, over time, the United States should
learn to live comfortably within the WTO dispute settlement system. However,
we still need to see what happens pursuant to section 125 reviews in Congress
as the WTO system evolves in the future.
D.G. WADDELL: From a Canadian perspective, and as one of the more frequent
users of the system, the new WTO dispute settlement system has worked, and
is working, extremely well since its inception just over three years ago. Canada is
third, after the United States and European Union, in the number of consultations
requested.
Panel and appellate body decisions have been timely, well reasoned, and estab-
lished important guidance to interpreting WTO obligations. I would emphasize
in particular the fact that once the panel and appellate body reports have been
adopted, unsuccessful defendants have committed to implement the DSB recom-
mendations. So far, this has strengthened overall discipline within the trading
system. Canada, for its part, has indicated its intention to implement the panel
findings on magazines within 15 months, by the end of next October. Make no
mistake, the panel outcome is not popular in Canada. But, the Canadian govern-
ment has made clear that Canada will respect the decision, and live up to its
obligations. But Canada will also provide support for publishers of Canadian
magazines, consistent with trade obligations.
I will confine myself to three observations based on the excellent paper prepared
by Ambassador Yerxa and Mr. Marantis. First, a fair assessment of the new
system from a trade policy, if not a legal practitioners' perspective, must look
beyond a simple accounting of the outcome of disputes for which there has been
a panel decision. The rigour of the dispute settlement system has encouraged
members to reach mutually agreed solutions prior to reaching the litigation stage
of the process. This has resulted in improved market access for Canadian products.
Canada has made nine requests for consultations-seven of these have been
resolved satisfactorily-five through negotiations and two as a result of panel
decisions; two remain outstanding: one at the panel stage and the other at the
consultation stage. The U.S, too, can point to similar positive results resolving
disputes and improving access for U.S. goods and services.
My second observation relates to the U.S./Japan film dispute. Since the panel's
findings in this matter have not yet been circulated to Members of the WTO,
Canadian legal and trade policy experts have not yet had an opportunity to examine
the rationale in support of the findings. The findings are understandably a disap-
pointment to the United States. However, this should not lead to the conclusion
that the panel was at fault, that the system is not functioning effectively, or that
it is operating against the United States' interests. Non-violation arguments are
difficult to make. Canada, at least, subscribes to the position that panels are not
to make new rules but to apply the existing rules, a view that the United States
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has shared in the past. We will all want to study the full report carefully and
assess its implications.
Does it mean that the dispute settlement system has fallen short of expectations,
as suggested by Ambassador Yerxa? Or, does it lead to a conclusion that there
is a problem with the disciplines? If so, it is for Members to strengthen the
disciplines through negotiation.
Alternatively, it may be that there is nothing wrong with the rules, but the WTO
dispute settlement system is not adequately equipped to make determinations of
the facts applicable in a particular case. We all like to win. We understand the
political imperatives of a win/lose score card. However, losing does not mean
that the system is not working. It is in all members' interest to have a strong
rules based system. Ensuring predictability and stability in the application of the
rules is so important for traders.
My third observation relates to the risks of invoking the national security
exception in a dispute. Just as the United States was disappointed with the outcome
of the film dispute, Canada has been disappointed and concerned by the U.S.
response to the possibility that a panel might be asked to examine the consistency
with the rules of measures under Helms-Burton, measures that have an impact
on Canadian investors and traders. Mr. Yerxa's paper raises the right questions.
I would underscore one question that goes well beyond the specifics of the Helms-
Burton dispute. If one subscribes to the view that the national security exception
is an entirely self-justifying provision which, once invoked, offers blanket protec-
tion, is there not a risk that others might claim national security exemptions on
matters fundamental to their national and political interests, broadly defined,
when the rules do not suit?
There have been assertions that Helms/Burton measures are "political" and
that Canada and the EU should exercise restraint in exercising trade agreement
rights and seek solutions through consultations. The burden of exercising restraint
should not rest exclusively on Canadian and European shoulders.
To conclude, Canada is very pleased with the efficient functioning of the WTO
dispute settlement system. We recognize the system is not perfect and we have
had to deal with some procedural and technical difficulties over the last three
years. Our experience with dispute settlement in the NAFTA context has made
us conscious of various options, some of which might improve the process, and
some of which highlight the advantages of the WTO standard of appeal and the
efficiency of panel selection.
However, Members have worked around the procedural and technical difficult-
ies when using the dispute settlement system. In the discussions that will be held
this year regarding the review of the dispute settlement understanding, we must
keep in mind that the system is still a new one despite its extensive use: a work
in progress. It may well be in the interests of all Members to have a thorough
exchange of views on a number of issues but to let the system evolve a little bit
longer before proposing changes and/or amendments. What we do not want are
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the changes, or even the review process itself, to jeopardize the present efficient
functioning of this valuable dispute settlement mechanism: the jewel in the crown,
which preserves a strong rules-based multilateral trading system.
BERND LANGEHEINE: Langeheine commented that the European Union gener-
ally has been satisfied with the dispute settlement system. He observed that sover-
eignty concerns have been less significant for the EU Member states than for
the United States, because EU members were already used to living with the
European Court of Justice by the time WTO dispute settlement came along. Like
the United States, the EU has been a major user of the dispute settlement system.
It was involved as a complaining or defending party, or third party, in sixty-six
out of the first one hundred cases. Most cases involving the EU have concerned
agriculture and fisheries.
The dispute settlement system has been relatively efficient. The binding aspect
of the system has encouraged early settlement, but only when the issues have
been clear cut and not emotionally charged.
Langeheine expressed skepticism at Ambassador Shapiro's remark that cases
should be kept out of the WTO dispute settlement system simply because they
concern measures that were not motivated by a trade discriminatory animus.
Motivation for a measure that affects trade can be difficult to discern. He also
expressed skepticism at the suggestion that some commentors have made that
the approach of the Appellate Body vis-A-vis panel reports has been to "sweeten
the loss." A case in which the Appellate Body decision did not involve marginal
corrections in order to sweeten the loss was EU-BeefHormones, which involved
very delicate issues about a country's ability to provide its own level of regulatory
protection, as did the U.S. -Reformulated Gasoline case.
Next, Langeheine observed that no party has yet rejected a panel's findings.
He is particularly encouraged by the reaction of the U.S. Trade Representative
to the report in the Japan-Film case. He added that the outcome of that case
counsels development of rules to deal with competition policy, a proposal which
the European Union supports. Responding to Wilson's comments, he noted that
the European Union fully intends to implement any changes made necessary by
the decisions in EU-Beef Hormones and EU-Bananas.
Finally, on the subject of reforming the system, Langeheine stated that there
have been discussions within the European Union concerning development of
professional panels and enhancing transparency in the dispute settlement system.
He also commented that, in the long run, there is a need to develop rules to deal
with the relationship between trade and the environment. The absence of such
rules puts too much of a burden on panels and the Appellate Body by leaving
them with difficult policy decisions that should be made by the WTO Members
instead.
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